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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the dynamics of China’s health biotech clusters
from an interregional perspective. By treating clustering as the result of firms’ localization choices, the
paper examines whether and why different types of firms agglomerate in the various locations.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper employs a demographic approach that is inspired by
the 2006 work of Romanelli and Feldman on cluster development in the USA. It categorizes China’s
clusters based on differences in the degree of policy support and the nature of the science base. Then, it
draws a sample of 75 of China’s most visible firms and analyses them in terms of entrepreneurial
origin, their location and, if applicable, the location of their subsidiaries. By matching types of firms
with types of clusters, the paper highlights some characteristics of China’s regional development.
Findings – Studies on China’s high-tech agglomerations unanimously complain about a lack of
“creative buzz” compared to the vibrant clusters of for example, the Bay Area in the USA. The analysis
indicates that the lack of a creative culture is associated with the anatomy of cluster development. China’s
clusters grow to a significant extent by attracting enterprise subsidiaries to their sites. The authors argue
that these particular cluster anatomies are founded on China’s capital market. As the capital market is not
prepared to provide pre-revenue firms with sufficient funds, firms have to earn revenue quickly in order
to ensure their viability. Therefore, they concentrate on building up manufacturing capacity and
exploiting given technologies. The main point is that local governments as major providers of financial
support are instrumental in this process. The establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries in various
locations rests on the rationale of collecting funds. This leads to the conclusion that national capital
markets either reinforce or inhibit clustering depending on how much it allows the mobility of financial
capital. Local government funds do not travel far. This has an impact on the firms’ localization decisions
and their business strategies, which, in turn, affects the “culture” inside the clusters.
Research limitations/implications – This argument is based on a limited number of interviews
conducted by the authors or other researchers. In order to corroborate the link between the capital
market and local development trajectories, more evidence needs to be collected via interview surveys
and other means to extract financial information.
Originality/value – Unlike other research on Chinese clusters, this paper offers an interregional
perspective based on a demographic approach. The argument is original in linking regional cluster
dynamics with the national institutional set-up.
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1. Introduction
Researchers with diverse disciplinary backgrounds have identified industrial
clustering, the co-localization of related firms and institutions, as a fundamental cause
of regional differences in prosperity and welfare (Krugman, 1991; Storper, 1992;
Cooke et al., 1997; Porter, 1998; Breschi and Malerba, 2001). Despite removals of trade
barriers and major reductions in transportation and communication costs, local
environments are considered as a continuing source of competitiveness for individual
firms. Empirical studies on health biotechnology clusters have shown that research
universities, local access to venture capital, adequate infrastructure and support
services as well as active social networks are key success factors (Chiaroni and Chiesa,
2006). Many of these attributes can in principle be manipulated by industrial policy and,
indeed, the various approaches have been very appreciated by policymakers around the
world. As a consequence, countless science parks, industrial bases, technopoles, etc.
have sprung up to provide the environment thought to be conducive to the development
of selected industries.
During the past decades, industrial agglomerations have also emerged all over China.
While most of them focus on low-tech industrial sectors (Wang and Tong, 2005),
technology-intensive sectors are particularly encouraged and supported by the Chinese
Government as the utilization of new technologies – such as biotechnology – promises
to provide “windows of opportunity” to enter markets or market segments still devoid
of strong incumbent firms (Perez and Soete, 1988). Currently, there are about
50 national-level pharmaceutical and biotechnology industrial bases scattered around
the country. A growing body of literature has targeted these and other science-based
clusters as an object of inquiry. Both kinds of studies, those with and without a sectoral
focus, usually draw the conclusion that China’s parks miss the “creative buzz” resulting
from strong regional firm interaction (Cao, 2004; Sutherland, 2005; Wilsdon and Keeley,
2007; Su and Hung, 2009). By analysing the prevalent structures of China’s clusters and
comparing their main characteristics with those of model clusters, these studies are
instructive in that they point to some structural deficiencies. We argue, however, that a
more dynamic analysis can significantly enhance the evaluation of China’s cluster
development and the formulation of policy recommendations. This is because, first of all,
the Bay Area (“Silicon Valley”) model that currently provides the general benchmark
for policy design and the evaluation of cluster success is based on the characteristics of
a rather mature cluster. That is, the features of that model, which are extensively worked
out in the literature, were not present when the cluster emerged (Feldman and
Braunerhjelm, 2006). It is thus difficult to compare China’s still nascent agglomerations
with the ideal. Second, empirical studies demonstrate that clusters can feature quite
different structures in the sense of cluster-internal and external linkages (Markusen,
1996). The diversity of cluster organization hints at the possibility that historical
dynamics prevent clusters (like other kinds of organizations, cf. Aoki (2010)) from
converging towards identical structures.
The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to an understanding of the dynamics
of China’s health biotech cluster development. In order to capture the historical
processes, our starting point is the idea that cluster expansion is driven by the
establishment of new firms and that local dynamics (and prevalent structures) depend
on what type of firms are established and what type of business strategies are pursued.
By employing an interregional perspective, clustering is basically treated as the result
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of firms’ localization choices. This perspective provides the rationale for our empirical
analysis. Concerning types of firms our investigation is informed by Elaine Romanelli’s
and Maryann Feldman’s pioneering work on the anatomy of cluster development in the
USA. Their demographic approach seeks to trace “the organizational and geographic
origins of entrepreneurs and firms who populate an industry cluster” (Romanelli and
Feldman, 2006, p. 87). Accordingly, we examine whether and why certain types of firms
agglomerate in particular locations in China. Our approach will be shown to be
instrumental in identifying patterns of cluster development and linkages to the
macro-institutional environment that are neglected in the aforementioned studies on
China’s science-based clusters. In particular, we highlight the impact of China’s capital
market on the firms’ localization decisions, their business strategies and, in turn, the
“culture” inside the clusters.
The paper is organized into four further chapters: in Section 2, we explain the
theoretical foundations of our demographic approach. The theoretical chapter is
followed in Section 3 by an analysis of China’s cluster development. We categorize
China’s clusters based on differences in the degree of policy support and the nature of the
science base. Then, we draw a sample of 75 of China’s most visible firms and analyse
them in terms of entrepreneurial origin, their location and, if applicable, the location of
their subsidiaries. By matching types of firms with types of clusters, we highlight some
characteristics of China’s regional development. In Section 4, we analyse the findings in
the light of previously published interview surveys of China’s health biotech sector and
our own interviews. On that basis, we develop our argument that cluster anatomies are
closely linked to the prevailing institutional and structural set-up of the (venture) capital
market. We argue that this relationship holds not only for China, but for other economies
as well. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical foundations of cluster formation
2.1 The use of co-location
Despite ongoing globalization, industrial activities remain concentrated in a few regions.
Geographic proximity apparently offers advantages that render co-location of firms
attractive. Alfred Marshall already identified three types of positive externalities
that individual firms enjoy when they are co-located with a sufficiently large amount of
other firms performing complementary and even rivalling activities: a pooled skilled
labour market, opportunities for product specialization and knowledge spillovers
(Krugman, 1991).
Basically, agglomeration economies can be rationalized as conferring informational
advantages that increase the opportunity sets for suppliers and potential users of
specialized inputs. With regard to labour markets, suppliers of human capital (skilled
workers) are attracted to the enterprise cluster as they are able to choose from a larger
number of employment opportunities. Employers, in turn, profit from the larger and
more diverse pool of potential employees. This is particularly helpful for small
enterprises that have not yet managed to gain a reputation and scale that catches the
attention of potential employees. Small enterprises can more easily find staff because
the existence of further employment opportunities in the region reduces the risk of any
employee with regard to accepting a position in a fledgling firm. Indeed, a vibrant cluster
distinguishes itself by workers identifying themselves with a region such as Silicon
Valley or Hollywood instead of a particular firm. In principle, a similar logic also applies
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to specialized suppliers and users of services and of intermediate products as well as
suppliers of early-stage financial capital, if the latter’s monitoring of investee firms
requires them to reside in geographical proximity (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). In other
words, clustering is driven by a shared belief among (ignorant) agents that the
opportunities (the likelihood of “meeting” or “learning”) at a given location are larger
than those in other locations.
Besides private inputs, clustering of firms also has advantages in attracting public
investments (Henderson, 1986). The more firms of a given industry agglomerate in a
location the more the industry is recognized as vital to increasing the tax revenue of the
government (and thus the region’s welfare). This renders it more likely that (local)
governments devise preferential policies and invest into an infrastructure adequate to
the further development of the industry[1]. To put it succinctly, the likelihood of meeting
an industry-friendly government rises with the number of resident firms.
In vibrant clusters, the beliefs of firms and entrepreneurs get reinforced as their access
to inputs such as human and financial capital, intermediary products and services as
well as technologies affords them a competitive advantage over rivals from other
regions. Access, in turn, is a knowledge-intensive affair. The literature has identified
two different kinds of processes in which geographical proximity can play an important
role. On the one hand, the nature of knowledge may render frequent face-to-face
(or firm-to-firm) interaction necessary. The more “tacit” specific kinds of knowledge are,
the more its diffusion hinges on personal contact and interactive learning ( Jensen et al.,
2007). On the other hand, the governance of exchange relationships – most importantly,
the exchange of knowledge – may be facilitated through interaction in local networks, in
which misconduct becomes readily known and punished by the community. In this
sense, localized networks provide a hybrid mode of governance between market and
hierarchy (Williamson, 1991). However, none of these processes need to be necessarily
localized. While geographic proximity facilitates information searches and task
coordination, location may matter more for certain types of activities and industrial
sectors than others (Feldman, 1999). As to science-based industries like biotechnology
and pharmaceuticals, much of the new knowledge created is codified so that the general
problem particularly concerns the interpretation of the “code”[2]. Knowledge diffuses
in “epistemic communities”, whose members share the prior related knowledge
(the “absorptive capacity”, cf. Cohen and Levinthal (1990)) needed to understand new
ideas. By the same token, inter-firm networks usually extend beyond a region. In fact,
several authors have pointed out that cluster-external linkages are important for a firm’s
competitiveness (Orsenigo, 2006). Malmberg and Power (2005) again find little evidence
in their review of the empirical cluster literature that firms are tightly interconnected
within clusters. Hence, while in the first case “cognitive” proximity appears to trump
geographical proximity, in the latter case it is organizational proximity that matters
(Boschma, 2005).
As it appears, knowledge spillovers are more informal in nature and often a
by-product of social dynamics, in particular local labour market dynamics (Breschi and
Lissoni, 2001; Malmberg and Power, 2005). In effect, we may argue that while clustering
is based on the perceived likelihood of meeting related people and firms, the knowledge
gained through actual meetings – opportunities, shared perceptions, routines and
values – accounts for the advantage of residing in a particular cluster (Malmberg and
Maskell, 2006). This kind of knowledge is less concrete, less deliberate and more
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subtle than, for example, explicit technical knowledge and is substantially predicated on
the societal background (Gertler, 2003). Most of all, the types of organizations residing
or getting established in a region enable or restrict the opportunities for different kinds
of knowledge exchange. Organizations differ in their range of activities and, therefore,
their need for (local and extra-local) interaction with other organizations. They may have
different needs for particular input markets. Hence, we can expect that local firm
demography has a decisive impact on the “cultural” beliefs that account for particular
characteristics of a given cluster.
2.2 The dynamics of clustering
While increasing returns to agglomeration reinforce the advantages of particular
locations over others, a basic problem consists of triggering a virtuous clustering cycle.
If we assume, for a moment, that input endowments and psychological attitudes towards
entrepreneurship are equally distributed across space, then there need to be local events
that set regions apart. Chiaroni and Chiesa (2006) have identified two generic forms of
cluster creation in biotechnology. One of them are spontaneous clusters where clustering
is started by an initial upswing of entrepreneurship based on some chance events.
A second method that has been employed in order to raise the saliency of a region is to
trigger clustering through planned government action. According to this approach, an
agency is established (e.g. a science park administration), which proactively promotes
the development of a local industry. In principle, both of these forms – spontaneous and
policy driven clusters – can, but do not have to, generate a virtuous cycle. As Feldman
and Braunerhjelm (2006) argue, the genesis of a cluster does not tell what happens in
following phases of a cluster’s life cycle.
If the initial firms are able to grow into viable enterprises, a second phase sets in.
As a stylized process, the following phase is described by Feldman et al. (2005, p. 133) in
this way:
Having the experience and example of the initial start-ups, the successful cluster becomes
self-sustaining: entrepreneurs attract physical and human capital to the area, public and
private networks are built up to support and facilitate the ventures, relevant infrastructure is
created through public and private initiatives and services grow to feed these companies.
There is a noteworthy point in this description: in order for clusters to expand, inputs to
the sector have to increase by means of production within and/or attraction of inputs from
outside the cluster. This, in turn, implies that national factor markets play a role in
local dynamics. Hence, while the competitive advantage of a region is based on internal
organization, the internal dynamics and the extent of local variation is limited by national
institutions such as the capital and labour market.
As Romanelli and Feldman (2006) show with regard to health biotech clusters in the
USA, regions develop in idiosyncratic ways through the establishment of particular
firms. In line with their approach we can distinguish between following types of firms
that, at the time of their establishment, display different types of organization in the sense
of firm-internal and -external input linkages:
. Start-ups or spin-offs from a university or public research institute. Academic
spin-offs represent one of the main forms of science-industry linkages. In
science-based industries, these firms play an important intermediary role in the
diffusion of scientific knowledge (Stuart et al., 2007).
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. Start-ups or spin-offs from existing enterprises. Industrial spin-offs concern new
enterprises formed by employees of existing enterprises. Thus, they can be viewed as
“second-generation entrepreneurship” (Romanelli and Feldman, 2006). According to
previous studies of this phenomenon, these spin-offs often pursue business
strategies that are related to the ones of the parent firms, but without posing
a substantial threat to their parents (Klepper, 2001). With regard to biotechnology, the
highly successful cluster of San Diego in the USA has been described as an
outstanding example of how this second-generation entrepreneurship can propel
a region’s cluster development (Casper, 2007). In fact, Romanelli and Feldman (2006)
have singled out this phenomenon as the most decisive factor that differentiates
vibrant regions from those staying behind.
. Subsidiaries of enterprises. The establishment of subsidiaries usually trails the
successful take-off of a regional cluster. Enterprises from other regions and/or sectors
are lured into the cluster following their belief about opportunities to tap particular
local assets. Above all, the localization decisions of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) are important. On principle, their investments are input (human and financial
capital, knowledge) seeking, market seeking or efficiency seeking (Dunning, 1998).
With regard to biotechnology, European MNEs have predominately entered
regions in the USA in order to tap local knowledge.
. Wholesale re-locations of existing firms. As an effect of the salience of a region,
enterprises re-locate to the cluster in order to enjoy the more favourite environment.
Like subsidiaries, the firms’ decisions reinforce the divergence of regional
expansion trajectories.
Altogether, several regions may spawn a number of related enterprises. However,
the locations, which are at the risk of becoming a cluster, differ in their internal
dynamics. On the one hand, there exists a demonstration effect. Successful
spin-offs fire the imagination of would-be entrepreneurs and, possibly, that of
venture capitalists. Particular types of firms attract similar endeavours thus
forming an idiosyncratic development trajectory. One of the examples is the
San Diego cluster mentioned above. Another vivid example is Romanelli and
Feldman’s (2006) discussion of the New York region, where most of the expansion
is due to subsidiaries and relocations, while indigenous start-up activity already
ceased very early in the cluster’s life cycle. On the other hand, the organizations
that exist at a certain point of time provide opportunities for further
entrepreneurship. These opportunities, however, differ across clusters according
to the business strategies local firms pursue. Business strategies differ with regard
to the integration or specialization of activities of the supply chain, product
portfolios and the firms’ readiness for cooperation and knowledge exchange with
other organizations. Depending on the business strategies and respective
organizational forms, local opportunities for specialization and the diffusion of
knowledge diverge. As a consequence of the dynamics at the first and second stage
of a cluster’s life cycle, the time of entry into the third (maturation) stage and the
structure of clusters at that stage should therefore differ substantially between
clusters. Below, we examine the first two stages in the development of China’s
clusters in health biotechnology.
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3. Sketches of China’s health biotech cluster development
3.1 Cluster genesis
Since the early 1990s, China has spawned numerous agglomerations related to the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector. Several policy programmes were launched to
support local cluster development. Among them, the Torch Programme initiated in 1988
by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) concerns the establishment of
high-tech development zones (science parks) and industrial bases[3]. The currently
67 national-level science parks are set up with the intention to promote science-industry
linkages – in particular, by means of academic spin-offs (Gu, 1999). Torch Programme
industrial bases, 28 of which are targeting the pharmaceutical sector, predominately
serve to upgrade local manufacturing capabilities (Torch and MOST, 2010). Apart
from MOST, another important agency – the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), which is charged with devising strategic plans and supporting the
development of “strategic” industrial sectors – has started another programme in 2005.
NDRC has approved 23 national biotechnology industrial bases, which are usually
located within the science parks mentioned above. Because several cities feature more
than one industrial base, the present number of cities involved amounts to about 40
(Figure 1).
The possibility to identify regional clusters via government-sponsored parks
already indicates that the Chinese government is deeply involved in the development of
regional industry. Hence, biotechnology clusters in China can be considered to be
essentially policy driven (Prevezer and Tang, 2006; Prevezer, 2008; Su and Hung, 2009).
Focusing on Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, Prevezer and Tang (2006) yet detect local
differences in the role of government. Arguably, differences can be traced back to the
origin of China’s health biotech clusters. In order to analyse these varieties, we start our
Figure 1.
Torch Programme
Industrial Base
National Biotech
Industrial Base
Jilin
Shandong
Jiangsu
Shanghai
Zhejiang
Guangdong
Beijing
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analysis by examining the types of policy support provided in the different localities. We
look at those 19 cities that feature firms from the enterprise sample being introduced
more systematically in the next section. All of these localities have developed
a pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector, albeit to a differing degree.
As can be seen from Table I, the cities can be tentatively grouped into seven
categories. Whereas cities in the first four categories maintain national-level science
parks, those in the latter three categories do not feature parks especially targeting
high-tech sectors such as the one that is the focus of the present paper. In those
latter cities, specialized policy support is given on the basis of endogenous
developments. For example, Xinxiang (Henan Province) is home to a well-known
Chinese pharmaceutical company, Hualan Bio. The company was established in 1992
by an entrepreneur who had worked at a public research institute of the Ministry of
Health before he returned to his hometown (BioPlan, 2008). When the Torch Programme
industrial base was launched in 2010, the policy programme provided acknowledgment
to the local development taking place based on Hualan’s success. Other localities have
a longer history with regard to the pharmaceutical industry. Tonghua, for example, is
situated at the foot of Jilin Province’s Changbai Mountains, which host a wealth of
flora that can be used in traditional Chinese medicines. Until 1980, eight factories had
been established there to exploit these natural resources. When the reform process
started in the 1980s, these first companies’ technicians began to establish their own
private firms or contracted out one of the previously state-owned enterprises (Liu, 2009).
The dynamics in Tonghua therefore resemble those of many low-tech clusters elsewhere
in China (most of all, in Zhejiang Province, cf. Wang and Tong (2005)). Tonghua is one
of the two cities (the other one being Dezhou in Shandong Province) that has a biotech
base not located in a national-level science park.
Compared to the development of the biopharmaceutical industry in advanced
economies, one of the distinguishing characteristics of China’s localities at the first
stage of the cluster life cycle is the nature of their science base. The general expectation
would be to find clusters of a knowledge-based industry in science centres, localities
with a reasonably strong science base (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Zucker et al., 1998).
However, as the examples pointed out above suggest, this is not necessarily the case in
China. Many of China’s health biotech clusters are not situated in localities with a
Science
park
Biotech
base
Torch
base
Other
zones Cities
1 † † † Xi’an *, Harbin *
2 † † Beijing *, Shanghai *, Tianjin *, Changchun *,
Hangzhou *, Chengdu *, Chongqing *,
Guangzhou *, Shenzhen, Shijiazhuang, Yantai
3 † † Dalian *, Jinan *, Suzhou ( þ Wuzhong)
4 † Shenyang *, Hefei *, Xiamen *, Fuzhou, Zhuhai,
Zhongshan (Suzhou)
5 † † Tonghua
6 † Xinxiang (Wuzhong)
7 † Xuzhou, Tai’an, Changzhi, Dongyang
Note: Science centres are signified by a “ *”
Table I.
Differences between
health biotech clusters
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strong science base. In order to explicate this point more clearly, we need to identify
China’s science centres. Although China possesses a large number of academic
institutions, there exist major qualitative differences between them (Kroll et al., 2010).
The 39 most prestigious universities are included in the 985 Project of the Ministry of
Education. These universities are situated in 20 cities, which also happen to be the home
of virtually all institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)[4]. Therefore, it
appears reasonable to refer to those cities as China’s science centres. All of these science
centres – which are marked in Table I by a “ *” – can be subsumed under one of the first
four categories.
We can also recognize that every of the first four categories also feature cities that are
not science centres according to our classification. This also applies for the first
category, because a complete examination of all relevant cities would show that Taizhou
( Jiangsu Province) is the third member of the first category. In particular, the special
economic zones Shenzhen and Zhuhai stand out as they do not correspond to the notion
of science centres. While Shenzhen, for example, has made great endeavours to remedy
the lack of academic institutions (for example, by establishing a “virtual university”, cf.
Walcott (2003)), the city’s main strength still is its comparatively conducive regulatory
environment. Nonetheless, Shenzhen was among the first cities with a national-level
science park. Interestingly, Shenzhen has also originated China’s first modern health
biotech company – Shenzhen Kexing – merely ten years after the original fishing
village started its economic rise. The enterprise was established to commercialize
technology derived from research institutes from science centres, especially Beijing.
In summary, we can group the cities along two dimensions: the sophistication of the
science base and the degree of policy support. The latter appears to be a particularly
distinguishing factor in cities with a lower science base, the periphery. While in some
peripheral cities, most notably Shenzhen, the development of high-tech sectors has
followed policy incentives, in other cities, especially Tonghua, policy support has increased
in lieu with endogenous developments.
3.2 Cluster demography
Cluster development implies above all a quantitative expansion of firms of a given
industrial sector. As we have pointed out in Section 2, this development may differ
according to the type of firms that agglomerate in a particular location. In order to
analyse the development of China’s health biotech clusters, we draw upon a sample of
75 of the most highly visible biopharmaceutical manufacturing enterprises[5]. The
construction of the sample is explained in the Appendix. Due to our selection criterion, the
featured enterprises are comparatively mature. They were established between 1981 and
2007 with the median enterprise being founded in 1994. Our sample includes firms from
the cities named in Table I. Since the firm types explained in the preceding chapter are
defined on the basis of linkages among firms (industrial spin-offs, enterprise subsidiaries)
and between firms and academia (academic spin-offs), we have excluded those firms,
which we have recognized as subsidiaries of other domestic firms, from the sample. That
is, in contrast to academic and industrial spin-offs, we examine subsidiaries – even
renowned ones such as Shandong Kexing – implicitly by associating these with their
parent firms. Therefore, our analysis actually covers a higher number of enterprises.
The main attributes of the featured enterprises are shown in Table II. As would be
expected for a science-based sector, the firms are not evenly distributed between
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science centres and the periphery. Given the emphasis of the literature on Beijing,
Shanghai and Shenzhen, the high number of enterprises from those cities – almost half
of the sample – appears to be unsurprising as well. Nonetheless, 40 firms originate from
other cities. This suggests that too narrow a focus on those three locations will do
injustice to China’s overall sectoral development trajectory (Conle´ and Taube, 2010).
Another expected result is that more than one-third of the companies in the sample can
be categorized as academic spin-offs. In the Chinese context, two kinds of academic
spin-offs can be distinguished. The first kind has been dubbed by an earlier paper of
Eun et al. (2006) as “spin-arounds” as these firms have remained tightly connected to
their parent institute. Especially the institutes of the CAS have spawned such
enterprises (Suttmeier et al., 2006), some of which – e.g. BioSino, a spin-off of the CAS
Institute of Biophysics – are active in the pharmaceutical sector. In the second type,
the parent institute or university is however only marginally involved. In this case, the
technology and/or the entrepreneur comes from the academic institution. Yet while the
parent research institutes/universities may in some cases be still present in the names of
these enterprises, actual cooperation is limited (or even absent). An interesting fact is
that seven academic spin-offs from our sample are not established at the location of the
parent institution. Whereas all of the remaining 20 spin-offs are situated in the science
centres, five of these seven firms were established in the periphery, four of them in
Guangdong Province’s special economic zones. Although spin-offs of the second type
often remain nearby their parent institutions, these spin-offs also appear to be attracted
to particular locations (Walcott, 2003).
As we have reported above, Romanelli and Feldman (2006) find that in the case of the
USA industrial spin-offs provide a major explanation for the differential success of
a region’s sectoral expansion. When we look to China, it is interesting to note that we
have – until now – found no evidence for domestic industrial spin-offs. This observation
excludes Tonghua whose cluster development is based on such spin-off activity.
Number of surveyed enterprises 75
Location
Science centres 55
Only Beijing and Shanghai 28
Periphery 20
Only Shenzhen 7
Type of enterprises
Academic spin-offs 27
Established at a different location 7
Returnee enterprises 14
Enterprises with returnees in management 19
Domestic subsidiaries
Firms with subsidiaries 36
With subsidiaries at a different location 25
Academic spin-offs with subsidiaries 15
With subsidiaries at a different location 10
Returnee enterprises with subsidiaries 5
With subsidiaries at a different location 4
Number of firms having acquired other firms 11
Number of firms having established new firms 34
Table II.
Main attributes
of the firm sample
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But even there this type of enterprises appears to be mainly a characteristic of the first
phase of that location’s cluster life cycle, when the state-owned sector of the
planned-economy period was abandoned. Nonetheless, there exists a particular kind of
industrial spin-offs in China if we consider migration into China’s clusters from outside
the country. This concerns the recent proliferation of returnee enterprises, firms that are
established by Chinese scientists returning from extended work and study stays in other
countries. Many of these returnees have gained experience through their work in
pharmaceutical and health biotech companies in advanced countries, especially in the
USA. Chinese Government policy has targeted these entrepreneurs by offering
preferential treatment (Kroll et al., 2010). In our sample, 14 enterprises can be considered
to be returnee enterprises, while internationally experienced scientists have joined the
management of (at least) five more firms. Earlier studies (Sternberg and Mu¨ller, 2005;
Chen et al., 2011) have focused on the major research hubs – especially Shanghai – to
explore this phenomenon. However, the returnee enterprises in our sample are distributed
quite equally among nine cities, virtually all of which have a national biotech base.
While we do not have enough information to trace the specific historical development
paths of China’s biotech clusters, our analysis indicates that their trajectories are
highly contingent on the establishment of firms by entrepreneurs from outside the
locality. This is most obvious in the case of Shenzhen. Five of Shenzhen’s seven featured
companies are either academic spin-offs or returnee enterprises attracted to the city.
While Shenzhen is unique in this regard, the more common strategy is apparently
to support the establishment of firm subsidiaries. From a legal point of view,
most of the returnee enterprises are, in fact, subsidiaries because the returned
entrepreneurs usually establish a company in the USA (or a tax haven) first and then set
up a “foreign-invested” enterprise in China (Sternberg and Mu¨ller, 2005). Moreover,
pharmaceutical multinationals have increased their investments strongly in the wake of
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 by establishing factories as well as R&D centres
(Conle´ and Taube, 2010). Yet, subsidiaries of domestic companies also appear to play a
major role in the regional development of China’s health biotech sector. Almost half of
the companies in our sample possess stakes in other (domestic) firms. These subsidiaries
have increased the number of firms situated at the same location. Interestingly, about
70 per cent of those firms have subsidiaries that are located in a different city. For
academic spin-offs and returnee enterprises, this ratio is even higher.
The acquisition of a minority stake in another health biotech company may possibly
be rationalized as a mechanism to support a more intense exchange of knowledge
(Pisano, 1989). Yet, only 11 firms have obtained one or more subsidiaries – in science
centres or the periphery – by means of acquisition. In contrast, 34 firms have established
(or joined in establishing) those subsidiaries themselves. This occurrence is peculiar for
several reasons. First of all, whereas MNEs are establishing Chinese subsidiaries in
order to tap the domestic market and, maybe, keep informed about local technological
developments, domestic enterprises are already in the market. Second, the exploitation
of factor conditions may to some extent explain investments between science centres
and the periphery. It does not however illuminate the reasons for establishing
enterprises in the same type of location. Third, these decisions are all the more
surprising as those companies themselves are rather small in terms of labour force and
production capacity. So why do firms opt to establish subsidiaries and trigger a high
fragmentation of the biopharmaceutical industry (Chen et al., 2011) instead of
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increasing the production capacity of their existing plants? Why are so many and
diverse clusters able to expand by attracting firms and entrepreneurs from outside? In
order to get a more complete picture of the firms’ localization decisions, we may need to
go beyond the available numerical data.
4. Business strategies in China’s health biotech sector
We have argued in Section 2 that clusters develop idiosyncratic social dynamics depending
on the resident firms and their business strategies. Information on Chinese health biotech
firms is still scarce. However, we can rely on two sources to get a better understanding of the
sectoral processes. On the one hand, we will base our discussion on five published surveys
on China’s health biotech sector. These interview surveys provide a comprehensive
analysis of a number of selected firms (Table III). The surveys are supplemented by our
own interviews with ten firms in Shanghai and Beijing (see the Appendix). Although the
surveys address different questions, a review of these surveys reveals that they are
remarkably consonant with regard to some aspects that will inform our argument.
First of all, all reports agree that China’s health biotech sector overwhelmingly
consists of integrated firms with in-house manufacturing facilities. The integrated
business model contrasts with the model of the so-called dedicated biotechnology
firms (DBFs) encountered in many other countries, particularly the USA. In the USA,
only firms such as Genentech or Amgen that participated in the first wave of
biotechnology entrepreneurship in the late 1970s to early 1980s managed to become
integrated firms (Pisano, 2006). All subsequent industry entrants have remained
specialized on a range of activities of the drug discovery and development stages while
leaving manufacturing, marketing and distribution to the incumbent pharmaceutical
firms. The general explanation for the alliance phenomenon rests on specialized
complementary assets and capabilities (Teece, 1986). Whereas the technological
discontinuity of the biotechnology revolution eroded the capabilities of the incumbents
Survey Cases
Sternberg and Mu¨ller (2005) Interviews with 14 returned entrepreneurs in Shanghai. Information
of the types of activities performed by their firms and the
entrepreneurs’ motivations to establish the company in China
Prevezer and Tang (2006) Information on the sectoral specialization of 131 firms in the Beijing
area, 111 in the Shanghai area and 110 in the Shenzhen area.
Discussion of characteristics of particular firms based on 20
interviews in Shenzhen and Beijing
Malone et al. (2008),
Richard et al. (2009)
Interviews of 19 Shanghai-based companies. Discussion of the
business models of those firms including product markets, access to
finance and cost strategy
Frew et al. (2008) Detailed case studies of 22 of China’s most innovative
biopharmaceutical firms. Information on patenting activity,
alliances with domestic and foreign entities, subsidiaries and joint
ventures as well as financial background
Chen et al. (2011) Interviews with 72 firms located in the Yangtze River Delta and
Beijing including 33 firms founded by returnees and 39 firms with
returnees as senior management. Information on their linkages to
international knowledge sources
Table III.
Previous surveys on
China’s health biotech
sector
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with regard to R&D, the complementary assets and capabilities with regard to bringing a
product through the cost-intensive clinical tests and to the consumer were not affected
(Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Grabowski and Vernon, 1994).
Chinese biotech firms have faced a different situation. Although a large number of
pharmaceutical enterprises were established during the pre-reform period (CPEMA, 2009),
these companies were initially mainly manufacturing entities. Due to the strong functional
specialization of the Soviet-style economy (Liu and White, 2001), these incumbents also
lacked the specialized complementary assets and capabilities in business functions such as
R&D and marketing. MNEs, in turn, were generally better positioned. However, several
impediments such as trade restrictions and their unfamiliarity with the Chinese market
have until recently limited the MNEs’ impact on China. In this sectoral environment,
integration has proven to be a viable strategy. Yet an integrated business model requires
firms to develop assets along the whole value chain. This implies that R&D may not top the
priority list for many companies. In fact, the domestic market is dominated by generic
biologics (Hu et al., 2006). Malone et al. (2008) report that the firms they surveyed were
predominately (preparing for) manufacturing biogenerics for the Chinese market.
Coinciding with our own observations, they also indicate that the development of sales
forces – usually in connection with the opening of sales departments in most provinces –
and effective marketing receive most of the enterprise managements’ attention.
This does not mean that the firms do not invest in R&D because even the development
of biogenerics requires substantial adjustments of process technologies. However, the
R&D process differs significantly from those firms that introduce novel products. In
China, universities and public research institutes are the primary producer of (patentable)
scientific knowledge (Chen et al., 2011). Linkages between academia and industry exist but
Chinese firms frequently search throughout the country for a suitable academic institution
that can help them to exploit a known (domestic) market opportunity. Academic spin-offs
have an advantage, as their entrepreneurs can utilize the technological knowledge gained
at their institution, when they migrate into business. Given the focus on biogenerics,
geographical proximity does not need to play a significant role. Nonetheless, a rising
number of domestic companies are working on new-to-the-world therapies. However, as
Frew et al. (2008) find, financial mechanisms to support such innovative activities provide
a major bottleneck. Venture capital, which is the primary financial vehicle to provide
start-ups with sufficient capital, is rather new to China. Moreover, the initial impetus for
venture capital provision came from the Chinese Government at national and particularly
local levels, while private domestic and foreign firms were only allowed to enter the market
since the late 1990s (White et al., 2005). The findings of Richard et al. (2009) mirror the
important role of local governments in new venture financing. According to their survey of
Shanghai companies, new biotech firms are established with funds from founders and
their friends and family and/or the local government. Growth financing was almost
exclusively provided through retained earnings and government funding schemes. As the
available funds are limited in size and distributed across a whole range of firms and
projects, they are inadequate to cover the immense costs of new drug development.
Frew et al. (2008) argue that innovative enterprises therefore try to subsidize their
exploratory activities with the manufacturing of generic, diagnostic and other (possibly
unrelated) products. Accordingly, the establishment of integrated firms appears not to be
merely a viable but also often a necessary option, because it ensures the availability of
sufficient funds to maintain a firm’s sustainability.
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These observations lead us to the main argument of this present paper. On the basis
of our own interviews, we suggest a link between the findings of Frew et al. (2008) as well
as Richard et al. (2009) and China’s cluster development through the establishment of
firm subsidiaries. If local governments are the major suppliers of venture capital, then it
may be rational to establish companies in multiple locations in order to collect more
funds. Our interviews in Shanghai and Beijing indeed provide some evidence that quite a
few localization choices are affected by this consideration. Firms have set up
subsidiaries in other cities with a substantial financial support of the local governments.
The importance of government finance may also explain to a good degree the
localization decision of migrating spin-offs and returnee enterprises. We believe that
this is a major difference between China and the USA: while in the USA venture capital
is reinforcing the superior dynamics of a particular region (Chen et al., 2009), China’s
government-dominated and regionally fragmented capital market is preventing the
evolution of an elite group of highly concentrated dynamic clusters. Instead, we observe
an excessively large number of smaller, less concentrated agglomerations.
5. Conclusions
Studies on China’s high-tech agglomerations unanimously complain about a lack of
“creative buzz” compared to the vibrant clusters of, e.g. the Bay Area in the USA. In order
to approach this problem, a straightforward policy recommendation would be to initiate
or strengthen local cluster policies that improve networking and knowledge exchange
between resident firms as well as support entrepreneurship through mechanisms such
as incubators and the provision of venture capital funds. Several of China’s policy
programmes, most importantly the Torch Programme, have taken up this advice.
However, our analysis indicates that these cluster policies will probably not have the
anticipated effect if they are not complemented by significant changes in the overall
institutional framework.
The opportunities for specialization and inter-firm collaboration are limited by the
dominant business strategies in China’s health biotech sector. Our main argument is
that these dominant strategies are brought about by the institutional framework, in
particular the constitution of the capital market. While, due to the historically grown
set-up of the industry, new entrants in recent years have been able to pursue integrated
strategies, they also had little other choices. In fact, they had to realize revenues, since
China’s capital market was and is still not prepared to finance risky pre-revenue
ventures. Many (or even most) enterprises, therefore, follow similar strategies that
render them direct competitors – “substitutors” rather than “complementors” in the
terms of Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995) – for opportunities to exploit domestic
market niches with technologies supplied by universities and public research institutes.
According to Hu et al. (2006), it is not uncommon for a particular biotech drug to be
manufactured by dozens of Chinese firms. Due to this practice, collaboration is restricted
to “exploitation alliances” (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004) between firms and academic
institutions, while exploration is not highly valued. The institutional environment gives
rise to firms that are more concerned about production capacity and market
development than about R&D. Even the finest of China’s health biotech firms cannot
escape this dominant logic.
The immaturity of venture finance in China constitutes a serious bottleneck for the
further development of the health biotech sector. On the surface, this situation supports
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a claim for local support of venture finance schemes. But this claim is unwarranted as
China’s localized cluster policies are rather the source than the solution to China’s lack
of “buzz”. By adopting an interregional perspective, we show that the strong involvement
of local governments in new venture and growth financing has a significant effect on the
anatomy of cluster development in China. Evidently, the source of venture capital plays a
decisive role not only in cluster-internal but also in interregional dynamics. In fact, we
maintain that these dynamics interact. National capital markets either reinforce or inhibit
clustering depending on how much it allows the mobility of financial capital. Local
government funds do not travel far. This has an impact on the firms’ localization
decisions and their business strategies, which, in turn, affects the “culture” inside the
clusters. As capital is not coming towards them, China’s firms have to travel to where the
capital is, i.e. they spawn subsidiaries in order to tap local sources of (venture) capital and
in this piecemeal fashion try to secure the financial means necessary for survival and
business development, respectively. This situation is most problematic for firms with the
potential to create novel products. While the financial support of local governments
allows for survival in the Chinese market, it does little to enhance their innovative
capacity. Instead, localized capital only allows for the (multiple) establishment of
inexpensive production technologies ( Jia, 2007), the recruitment of staff in regions with a
small science base and reduced opportunities for knowledge exchange.
From a theoretical point of view, we may have thus identified one particular way
(among others) in which the national institutional environment affects regional
development paths. While local clusters differ, the extent of variation is restricted by the
national environment. By comparing Chinese with US clusters, we find an important
difference: whereas cluster dynamics in the USA are driven by the local establishment of
academic and industrial spin-offs financed by venture capital funds flowing to the
successful regions, Chinese clusters grow by attracting direct investments from firms
having been established in other regions/countries. Certainly, our argument is based on
a limited number of cases. Hence, further studies are required to validate the link
between the capital market and local development trajectories in China.
If our view of institutional embeddedness is correct, then the immediate policy
implication is that the key to improving cluster dynamics ultimately rests on changes
in the national framework conditions, in particular the capital market. Above all,
changes would need to be directed towards a reduction in (local) government
participation. As long as the mechanism to pool funds, select and finance pre-revenue
firms is not altered, the economic organization of the industry will likely reproduce itself.
However, despite the current shortcomings, some regions – in particular, Shanghai –
appear to gradually distinguish themselves as a consequence of an exogenous shock,
the recent influx of R&D centres of large pharmaceutical MNEs. The foreign entrants
(and their business models) ameliorate the situation as they provide local firms with
new opportunities for collaboration that do not yet exist between domestic firms. To
our knowledge, their contribution to the diffusion of technological knowledge is very
limited. But as we have argued, local knowledge spillovers above all pertain to subtle
changes in perceptions and routines. Some domestic firms have seized the opportunity
to specialize on R&D activities predominately financed and guided by MNEs
(Sigurdson, 2005). By working with local firms, these MNEs may help to bring about
a more collaborative culture and would even more so within an improved
institutional framework.
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Notes
1. Of course, strategic industrial policy, e.g. the establishment of science parks, is based on the
belief of policymakers that the causality between private and public investments works both
ways. We return to this issue later.
2. See Cowan et al. (2000): “[C]odified knowledge [. . .] [makes reference] to codes, or to
standards – whether of notation or of rules, either of which may be promulgated by
authority of may acquire ‘authority’ through frequency of usage and common consent [. . .]
Knowledge that is recorded in some codebook serves inter alia as a storage depository, as a
reference point and possibly as an authority. But information written in a code can only
perform those functions when people are able to interpret the code; and, in the case of the
latter two functions, to give it more or less mutually consistent interpretations. Successfully
reading the code in this last sense may involve prior acquisition of considerable specialized
knowledge (quite possibly including knowledge not written down anywhere). As a rule,
there is no reason to presuppose that all people in the world possess the knowledge needed to
interpret the codes properly. This means that what is codified for one person or group may
be tacit for another and an utterly impenetrable mystery for a third.”
3. The information on China’s science parks is taken from: www.cadz.org.cn (in Chinese) and
that on the national biotechnology industrial bases from the website of the Chinese Society of
Biotechnology at: www.biotechchina.org (in Chinese) (accessed May 16, 2011).
4. These cities include Beijing, Tianjin, Shenyang, Dalian, Changchun, Harbin, Shanghai,
Nanjing, Hangzhou, Hefei, Xiamen, Jinan, Qingdao, Wuhan, Changsha, Guangzhou,
Chengdu, Chongqing, Xi’an (þ Yangling) and Lanzhou. See, e.g. www.gov.cn/fwxx/2009gk/
content_1314252.htm (in Chinese) (accessed July 28, 2011).
5. Not all of the companies that reside in those parks need to be manufacturing firms. While we
recognize that there may be other kinds of firms (e.g. contract research organizations), we
nonetheless strictly focus on manufacturing firms in this paper. As other researchers have
argued, manufacturing firms constitute the overwhelming majority of China’s
biopharmaceutical sector. For example, Miller et al. (2011) cite a 2003 survey published by
the MOST according to which “158 firms, 31 R&D institutions and 22 higher education and
subsidiary institutions were active in biotechnology in Shanghai. [. . .] [O]ver three-quarters
of all biotechnology firms in Shanghai were in the manufacturing sector.”
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Appendix. Methodology
(1) For our demographic analysis in Section 3 we have studied the web sites and, whenever
obtainable, the annual reports of Chinese health biotech companies. According to the 2008Annual
Statistical Report on Pharmaceuticals in China issued by the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT, 2009), there existed 750 enterprises in the biopharmaceutical and biochemical
segment of China’s pharmaceutical industry. As comprehensive industry directories are
unavailable for easy access of information on all these firms, we have restricted our attention on a
10-per cent sample (75 firms). Our selection criterion was importance, or visibility, in terms
of manufacturing and new product output. The firms in the sample are focusing on therapeutic
drugs, vaccines, diagnostic products and blood products, which, according to Chinese
classification, are also included in the biopharmaceutical segment. Since we do not analyse
the capabilities of the firms, we have yet not assured ourselves (and we do not claim) that
we have really identified the top ten per cent of the market segment. While searching for
visible firms, we have relied on three sources of information. First of all, we utilized the list of
firms with the largest biopharmaceutical output from the mentioned Annual Statistical Report
on Pharmaceuticals in China. We also consulted the Directory of Top 60 Biopharmaceutical
Manufacturers in China compiled by BioPlan (2008). The firms enlisted in these two sources
are overlapping to a significant degree. Moreover, the third source employed was written
material provided by zone administrations in Shanghai and Beijing, for example, the
“Investment Guide for the Biopharmaceutical Industry” of the Beijing Economic-Technological
Development Area.
Due to our interest in outstanding firms, we have given priority to the BioPlan list. We did
however not blindly rely on the directory but cross-checked the information with the firms’ web
sites. In this process, we had to exclude some firms that had to stop production for various reasons.
As the MIIT list does not only contain biopharmaceutical but also biochemical producers (e.g.
genetically modified crops producers), these were also excluded. Finally, we only considered firms
with a freely accessible web site. We started at the top of the lists and stopped when we had
obtained 75 useful cases. As we were concerned about the linkages between firms, we have
explicitly checked the selected firms for parent companies. If such a parent company was
identified, then we included the parent company instead of the subsidiary. However, we only
considered parent companies that were biopharmaceutical enterprises themselves. Whenever a
firm had a parent company that was from the financial sector, an unrelated industry or the
traditional pharmaceutical sector, then we neglected the parent company. The same applies to
subsidiaries of the firms. We only considered subsidiaries that could be identified as belonging to
the health and biotech sector. We excluded those subsidiaries that were mere marketing offices,
plasma collection stations (in the case of blood products manufacturers) or were engaged in
unrelated sectors.
After having concluded the selection process, we processed all available web site information
extracting information about the date of establishment, the origin of the enterprise, the existence of
subsidiaries and the locational choices. We employed a simple binary classification scheme to
determine whether a firm possessed a certain property or not. The properties we analysed include
academic spin-off, industrial spin-off, returnee enterprise, subsidiaries, subsidiaries in other
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locations, type of cluster, etc. Although this approach does not allow for determining the total
number of subsidiaries, we have decided to employ this approach to cope with the fact that some
web sites provided only incomplete information.
(2) For our discussion of the demographic analysis in Section 4 we refer to previous interview
surveys and own company interviews that we conducted with ten firms in Shanghai and Beijing
during February and September 2010 as a part of an exploratory survey. The firms were selected
from the same sources named above. Eight of the interviews were unstructured face-to-face
interviews that were usually conducted at the firm’s headquarters and lasted more than an hour.
The interviews were with CEOs, managers from R&D and quality supervision departments, as
well as marketing directors. Employing open-ended questions, we asked about the origin of the
firm, the development of the business organization, R&D and marketing performance, access to
finance and participation in public research projects. In two cases (both in September 2010), the
interview questions were administered via the telephone. Both of these interviews were shorter
in time and were focused on an understanding of the origin and development of a particular
linkage, in the first case the relationship between a firm and a university, in the second case
between two firms.
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